In a digital signature scheme with message recovery, rather than transmitting the message m and its signature σ, a single enhanced signature τ is transmitted. The verifier is able to recover m from τ and at the same time verify its authenticity. The two most important parameters of such a scheme are its security and overhead |τ | − |m|. A simple argument shows that for any scheme with "n bits security" |τ | − |m| ≥ n, i.e., the overhead is lower bounded by the security parameter n. Currently, the best known constructions in the random oracle model are far from this lower bound requiring an overhead of n + log q h , where q h is the number of queries to the random oracle. In this paper we give a construction which basically matches the n bit lower bound. We propose a simple digital signature scheme with n + o(log q h ) bits overhead, where q h denotes the number of random oracle queries.
Introduction
When transmitting a message m over an unauthenticated public channel, one usually appends a string σ to the message that can be used to verify (relative to a public key) the authenticity of the message. This string σ is called a digital signature of m. More generally, one transforms the message m into an enhanced signature τ such that (i) the original message m can be recovered from τ ; (ii) the authenticity of m can be verified from τ . This is called a digital signature scheme with message recovery (MR) and is used to save on bandwidth, i.e., to minimize the signature overhead informally defined as O = |τ | − |m| (signature length minus message length). Standard bodies for signature schemes (e.g. ISO/IEC 9796 and IEEE P1363a) contain several schemes with MR. In this paper we ask the natural question: what is the minimal overhead required to achieve a desired security level?
Bounds on the Overhead
A Trivial Lower Bound for Every Scheme. Following [3] , we say that a signature scheme has "n-bit security" if all adversaries A attacking the scheme have success ratio SR(A) at most 2 −n , where SR(A) := success(A)/time(A). A natural lower bound for the overhead of a signature scheme (with or without message recovery) for n-bit security is O ≥ n bits. This is since for a signature scheme with O bits of overhead any random bit string τ constitutes a valid enhanced signature with probability 2 −O . Hence an adversary A guessing a single random authenticated message τ has success ratio SR(A) = 2 −O which implies O ≥ n.
Overhead of Schemes without MR. In standard digital signature schemes (without message recovery) such as RSA full domain hash [5] , the probabilistic signature scheme PSS [5] , or (pairingbased) BLS signatures [6] the overhead equals the size of a signature. Since classical signatures contain (at least) one group element (e.g., Z * N or an elliptic curve group) whose representation requires at least 2n bits (for n bits security, due to generic square-root attacks) we cannot hope to obtain an overhead smaller than 2n bits. The above lower bounds do not apply for schemes without such a group structure, in particular schemes based on lattices or codes, but for other reasons these schemes tend to have a very large overhead and/or prohibitively large public parameters.
Overhead of Schemes with MR in the RO model. Computing the overhead for a given signature scheme turns out to be a bit subtle and depends on the security reduction. We exemplify such a calculation for the RSA-based probabilistic signature scheme with message recovery PSS-MR[n 0 , n 1 ] [5] , which can be seen as a two-round Feistel construction. PSS-MR[n 0 , n 1 ] has an overhead of n 0 + n 1 bits, where parameter n 0 controls the randomness and n 1 the amount of added redundancy used during signing. The minimal size of n 0 and n 1 providing a given security level can be computed from the security reduction. The security reduction from [5] in the random oracle model [4] transforms an adversary against PSS-MR[n 0 , n 1 ] making q s (online) signing and q h (offline) hash queries with success probability ε PSS-MR into an adversary against RSA with success probability ε RSA such that ε PSS-MR = ε RSA + ε sim , where ε sim = (q s + q h ) 2 (2 −n 0 + 2 −n 1 ). An easy computation shows that this implies O PSS-MR = n 0 + n 1 ≥ 2n + 2 log 2 (q h ) bits of overhead for n bits security. 1 An improved security reduction by Coron gives O PSS-MR ≥ 2n + log 2 (q h ) + log 2 (q s ). Recently, an alternative security reduction for PSS-MR was proposed in [15] demonstrating a tight security reduction for PSS-MR[n 0 = 0, n 1 ] with zero-padding from the (stronger) phi-hiding assumption [7] . However, the required overhead is still O PSS-MR = n + log 2 (q h ) bits, stemming from an additive term ε sim = q 2 h /2 n 1 in the security reduction. The Random Invertible Permutation Model. Besides the popular random-oracle model, signature schemes have also been analyzed in other idealized models. In particular, [16, 8] Table 1 : Overhead of RSA-based signature schemes with message recovery in the random oracle model for n bits security assuming the adversary makes at most q h hash and q s signing queries.
The table shows the overhead required for n = 80 (and only the trivial upper bound q h + q s ≤ 2 80 ) and when we additionally assume that the number of random-oracle/signature queries are upper bounded by q h ≤ 2 60 and q s ≤ 2 40 , respectively. As the o(log q h ) term in our bound depends on the domain, we give the bounds for 1024 and 2048 bits RSA.
a digital signature scheme with message recovery, together with optimal security reduction in the ideal random invertible permutation model. Unfortunately, unlike for random oracles, there is no standard cryptographic object which could be used to directly instantiate random invertible permutations over a large domain. 2 In order to get a construction in the random oracle model, one can replace the random invertible permutation P with some construction C H (based on a random oracle H) that is indifferentiable [18, 10] from P. In the context of signature schemes, already a weaker notion called "public-indifferentiability" [22, 11, 17] is sufficient. In [17] it is proven that a six-round Feistel network with random round functions is public-indifferentiable from a random invertible permutation. (For full indifferentiability more rounds are needed [14] .) Unfortunately, the reduction from [17] is not tight in the oracle query complexity (i.e., the number of queries made by the simulator is quadratic in the number of the queries made by the distinguisher), and as a consequence the required overhead is log(q h ) bits larger than in the ideal permutation model. Table 1 summarizes the signature overhead and gives concrete parameters for a typical security parameter of n = 80 bits and using 1024/2048-bit RSA. (Parameters for n ∈ {128, 192, 256} can be computed accordingly.) We remark that the table is only valid for sufficiently large messages, i.e., if |M | ≥ 1024 − O. For smaller messages standard signatures such as BLS naturally outperform any RSA-based signature scheme with MR.
Our contribution
Our main contribution is to revisit and affirmatively answer the question whether there exist signature schemes with minimal overhead in the random oracle model. In a first step we show that such a scheme exists in a new ideal model which we call random invertible function model, provided that the ideal functions' image is sufficiently sparse. Next, we show that a Feistel network with four rounds and random oracles as round functions is public-indifferentiable from a random invertible function with an almost tight reduction. Combining the two steps, we obtain a new signature scheme with message recovery with almost minimal overhead in the random oracle model.
Signature scheme with MR from random invertible functions. Given a trapdoor permutation TDP = (f, f −1 ) over {0, 1} k and an injective function F : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} k (k > m) that can be queried in both directions, we can define a signature scheme with message recovery SIG-MR F as follows. The enhanced signature τ on a message m is defined as τ = f −1 (F(m)). Signature recovery first evaluates the trapdoor permutation on τ and checks if the result has a valid pre-image or not, i.e., {m, ⊥} = F −1 (f(τ )). If the result is not ⊥, it returns message m. The overhead of SIG-MR F is O = k − m bits. It is a straight-forward generalization of [16, 15] , to prove that the resulting signature scheme SIG-MR F is tightly secure (losing an additive factor q F /2 k−m , where q F is the number of queries to F) if F is chosen at random. (The above scheme can only be proved secure assuming TDP is lossy [21] . Using a trick of [16] we can also prove a slightly modified scheme tightly secure assuming TDP is one-way.)
Instantiating Invertible Random Functions with Random Oracles. To instantiate the above scheme in the random oracle model, we must replace the random invertible function F : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} k with a construction C H that is public-indifferentiable from F.
It is easy to construct a random invertible function F : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} k from a random invertible permutation P : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} k (by setting F(x) = P(x 0 k−m )) with a tight reduction. But as discussed above, we do not know how to instantiate P in the random oracle model without losing at least a quadratic factor in the oracle query complexity [17] . Furthermore, it is well known that a five (or less) round Feistel network cannot be pub-indifferentiable from a random invertible permutation [17] .
A formal definition of pub-indifferentiability is given in Definition 2.1. The important parameters are the error ε sim and the number of queries q S made by the simulator S, which are both functions in the number of queries q D made by the distinguisher D. In order to get a reduction with optimal overhead, i.e., where the security (in bits) is not much smaller than the overhead O = k − m, we need q S ≈ q D and ε sim ≈ q D /2 k−m .
Two Feistel rounds. As a simple warmup example we show that a two-round Feistel network (with random oracles as round functions) is pub-indifferentiable from F with
The resulting signature scheme (as explained above) requires an overhead of O = n + log 2 (q h ) to achieve n bits security. This essentially reproves the overhead of PSS-MR obtained in [15] .
Four Feistel rounds. As the main technical result of this paper we give a construction C H
4F
based on a four round Feistel network and prove it pub-indifferentiable from F with
Hence the resulting signature scheme has an overhead of O = n + o(log q h ) bits, cf. Table 1 . The o(1) term can be computed explicitly and leads to 95 bits overhead for n = 80 bits security if the domain of the TDP is at least 1024 bits. (More concretely, the o(1) term goes to 0 as the ratio of the security we want to achieve, divided by the domain size of the TDP, decreases.) In the proof of (1), the variable Q(µ, q) = max X ,Z |{(x, z) |x ∈ X , z ∈ Z, z − x ∈ B}| (where B, X , Z are q element subsets of Z µ and B is sampled uniformly at random) will play a central role.
This variable has a natural interpretation in graph theoretical terms as we'll explain in Section 5.1. We prove by a compression argument (Corollary 6.3) an upper bound
(with probability extremely close to 1).
We believe that this bound may be of independent interest. It complements a result of Alon et al. [2, Th. 4] which states that Q(µ, µ a ) ≈ µ 3a−1 for 2/3 < a ≤ 1, i.e. their bound applies to large subgraphs of size ≥ µ 2/3 . We prove (Theorem 4.2) that the four round Feistel network C H 4F is pub-indifferentiable form a random invertible function with an error with a simulator making q S =Õ(q D ) queries and failing with probability ε sim = O(E[Q(µ, q D )]/2 k−m ) and a queries. Setting q D = µ a in (2) this gives the claimed bound (1) on the pub-indifferentiability of C H 4F . Very informally, the term Q(µ, q D ) show up in the proof as follows. Consider a q D query adversary who queries an unbalanced three round Feistel nework as illustrated in Figure 2 . Assume she queried the third oracle H 3 on inputs Z and the second on inputs Y (receiving outputs B). Next, she chooses some set X and queries the network on inputs (x, 0). If for some x ∈ X we have H 1 (x) ∈ Y and x + H 2 (H 1 (x)) ∈ Z, then the input to H 3 on this query has been already fixed, and the simulator can't program it. 3 Any tuple (x, y, z) ∈ X × Y × Z where x + H 2 (y) = z can lead to such a failure with probability
The expected number of such tuples (for an optimal choice of X , Z after seeing the random B) is Q(µ, q D ).
We leave it is an interesting open problem whether our techniques can be used to prove better bounds for constructions of permutations from random oracles. As mentioned above, currently all such constructions suffer from a quadratic increase in the oracle query complexity. Another interesting question is, whether random invertible functions can be used to build chosen-ciphertext secure encryption with optimal overhead. Interestingly, the construction from [1] also uses a four round Feistel network, but the proven security suffers from a quadratic loss in running time.
Preliminaries
For n ∈ N, we write 1 n for the string of n ones, and [n] for {1, . . . , n}. |x| denotes the length of a bitstring x, while |S| denotes the size of a set S. s ← S denotes sampling an element s uniformly at random from the set S. For an algorithm A, we write z ← A(x, y, . . .) to indicate that A is a (probabilistic) algorithm that outputs z on input (x, y, . . .). In the following we will introduce some basic cryptographic objects that (for simplicity) are defined over bit-strings (rather than arbitrary domains).
Ideal primitives and indifferentiability
Throughout, we use the letter H to denote a random oracle [4] , P for a random invertible permutation and F for a random invertible function.
A random oracle H : D → R with input domain D ⊂ {0, 1} * and range R ⊂ {0, 1} * is a function chosen uniformly at random from all functions D → R. A random invertible function F : D → R is a function chosen uniformly at random from all injective functions (i.e., all functions where x = x ⇒ F(x) = F(x )). A random invertible permutation P is a random injective function where D ≡ R.
Unlike for H, which can only be queried in forward direction, whenever we consider algorithms with oracle access to F (or P), it is always understood that F can be queried also in inverse direction. Technically, we can think of F as being given by two oracles F and F −1 , where F −1 (F(x)) = x and F −1 (y) = ⊥ if y is not in the range of F.
Below we define a pub-indifferentiable [11, 22] construction of F from H. The public indifferentiability notion differs from the standard indifferentiability notion [18, 10] by the fact that in the public notion the simulator S gets to see all queries made by D.
Definition 2.1 (pub-indifferentiability) A (q D , q S , ε sim , t sim )-public-indifferentiable construction of a random invertible function F from a random oracle H is a stateless oracle circuit C and a (stateful, probabilistic) simulator S such that for any distinguisher D making at most q D oracle queries, S makes at most q S oracle queries, runs in time at most t sim and the following holds:
here the second oracle S F gets to see also the queries made by D F ,S F to the first oracle F.
Digital signatures with message recovery
A digital signature scheme with message recovery SIG-MR = (G SIG-MR , Sign, Recover) consists of three algorithms and two function families m(n), k(n) describing message space {0, 1} m(n) and signature space {0, 1} k(n) . Key generation G SIG-MR generates a keypair (pk , sk ) ← G(1 n ) for a secret signing key sk and a public verification key pk . The signing algorithm Sign on input a message M ∈ {0, 1} m(n) and the secret signing key, and returns an enhanced signature τ ← Sign sk (M ) ∈ {0, 1} k(n) of the message. The recovery algorithm Recover takes a verification key pk and an enhanced signature τ as input and returns M ← Recover pk (τ ), where M ∈ {0, 1} m(n) ∪ {⊥}. We require that Pr[Recover pk (Sign sk (M )) = M ] = 1. The security of the signature scheme can be analyzed in a model where an idealized primitive exists, for example a random oracle or a random invertible function. In that case the adversary and the scheme get access to the idealized primitive O by making oracle calls.
Security. Let us recall the existential unforgeability against chosen message attacks (EUF-CMA) security game [12] relative to the ideal primitive O, played between a challenger and a forger A.
1. The challenger runs G SIG-MR (1 n ) to generate a keypair (pk , sk ). Forger A receives pk as input.
2. Forger A may ask the challenger to sign a number of messages and evaluate the ideal object O. To query the i-th signature, A submits a message M i ∈ {0, 1} m(n) to the challenger. The challenger returns an enhanced signature τ i under sk for this message. For the j-th query to O, A submits a query x j to the challenger who returns the values O(x j ).
3. Forger A outputs an enhanced signature τ * .
Let M * ← Recover(pk , τ * ) be the recovered message of A's forgery. The game outputs 1 (meaning forger A wins the game) if M * = ⊥ (i.e., τ * is a valid enhanced signature) and M * = M i for all i.
The success probability of A is the probability that the game outputs 1.
Definition 2.2 (Security and Overhead of SIG-MR) Let O be an ideal primitive and let SIG-MR
O be a signature scheme with message recovery, where {0, 1} m(n) is the message and {0, 1} k(n) is the signature space. Let t sig , q s , q o , ε sig be functions of a security parameter n.
Security: SIG-MR
O is (t sig , q s , q o , ε sig )-secure relative to O, if all adversaries A running in time at most t sig making at most q s signing queries and q o queries to O (this includes direct queries to O, but also the queries to O done during evaluation of the signature queries), have success probability at most ε sig . If O is a random oracle (random invertible function), then we say that SIG-MR O is secure in the random oracle (random invertible function) model.
n-bit security: We say SIG-MR O has n bits of security against q s , q o queries if it is (t sig , q s , q o , ε sig )-secure for all t sig , ε sig satisfying ε sig /t sig ≤ 2 −n . We simply say it has n bits security if it has n bits security for any q s , q o (we can always assume the trivial upper bound
O to reach n bits security against q s and q o queries.
In the following we will propose a scheme with finite message space. To obtain a scheme for any larger message space, one can apply the domain extension given in Appendix B.
Using a composition theorem [18] , we can express the security of a signature scheme proven secure in the invertible function model when we replace the invertible random function F with an pub-indifferentiable constructions C H as follows.
Theorem 2.3 If SIG-MR
F is (t sig , q s , q h , ε sig )-secure in the random invertible function model, and
C H is (t sig − t sim , q s , q S , ε sig + ε sim )-secure in the random oracle model.
Trapdoor Permutations
consists of three ppt algorithms. Key generation G TDP generates a keypair (ek , td ) ← G TDP (1 n ) of evaluation key and trapdoor. For every (ek , td ) in the domain of
We now recall the security properties of one-wayness and regular lossiness [15, 21] .
Definition 2.4 (Security of TDP) Let t = t(n) and ε one−way = ε one−way (n) be functions of a security parameter n. TDP is (ε one−way , t)-one-way if for all adversaries A running in time at
Definition 2.5 (Lossy TDP) Let t lossy = t lossy (n), = (n) and ε lossy = ε lossy (n) be functions of a security parameter n. A trapdoor permutation TDP over domain {0, 1} k(n) is regular (ε lossy , t lossy , )-lossy if there exists a ppt algorithm G lossy (the lossy key generator) that on input 1 n outputs ek such that 1. (indistinguishability of real and lossy keys) for all adversaries A running in time at most t lossy ,
For any ≥ 1, a lossy trapdoor permutation is collision-resistant when instantiated in lossy mode [21] . The most important example of a trapdoor permutation is RSA with domain Z * N , defined as f N,e (x) = x e mod N . It is homomorphic with respect to modular multiplication. It is one-way under the RSA assumption; for any e < N 1/4 it is furthermore regular e-lossy under the phi-hiding assumption [15] , where e is the public RSA exponent. Another example of a (homomorphic and regular lossy) trapdoor function is Paillier [20] .
Signatures with MR from random invertible functions
Let k = k(n) and m = m(n) be functions with k(n) ≥ m(n). Let TDP be a trapdoor permutation over domain {0, 1} k and F : {0, 1} m → {0, 1} k be a random invertible function. We build a signature scheme with message recovery SIG-MR F = (G SIG-MR , Sign, Recover) with message space
Note that SIG-MR has n 1 = k − m bits of redundancy and correctness follows since TDP is a permutation.
The following theorem proves security provided TDP is regular lossy. Its proof is similar to the one of FDH in [15] and postponed to Appendix C. Theorem 3.1 Suppose TDP is regular ( , t lossy , ε lossy )-lossy (i.e., lossy by log 2 ( ) bits) and F is a random invertible function from {0, 1} m to {0, 1} k . Then SIG-MR F is (t sig , q s , q f , ε sig ) secure with
In case TDP only satisfies the weaker security property of (t, ε one−way )-one-wayness, we only can obtain a non-tight security reduction [9] with respect to ε one−way . As we will show now, a tight security reduction from one-wayness can be obtained by padding M with one random bit b, using a reduction technique by Katz and Wang [16] . We now define an alternative signature scheme SIG-MR F ow with message space M(n) = {0, 1} m−1 which can be proved tightly secure from one-wayness of TDP.
It is furthermore enforced that Sign always uses the same random bit
ow has k − m + 1 bits redundancy. The proof of the following theorem is postponed to Appendix C. Theorem 3.2 Suppose TDP is homomorphic and (t, ε one−way )-one-way and F is a random injective function from {0,
4 Pub-Indifferentiable Constructions based on Feistel Networks
The two round Feistel network
Consider the two-round construction C H 2f : Figure 1 (left) which is derived from an unbalanced two-round Feistel network φ 2f instantiated with random oracles
This will serve as an example of a simple indifferentiability proof and to prepare for our four round Feistel network in the next section
More precisely, we can set t sim = O(q D log(q D ) log(µ)) using that the cost per (find or insert) operation on a sorted list with ≤ q D elements of size log(µ) bits is O(log(q D ) log(µ)).
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is postponed to Appendix A. There we also formally show that a combination with Theorems 3.1/3.2 and Theorem 2.3 leads to the overhead of O(n, q h , q s ) = n + log(q h ) bits for the two schemes SIG-MR
ow [RSA] in the random oracle model.
The four round Feistel network
We will prove the following theorem which bounds the pub-indifferentiability of our main construction C H 4F as illustrated in Figure 1 (right) in terms of the variable Q(µ, q) (which we discussed in the introduction, and will define formally in Section 5.1).
Given Theorem 4.2 we will now compute the concrete overhead of SIG-MR
ow [RSA] . Let N = pq be the RSA modulus with k = log N and recall that log µ = k − log ρ, where log ρ is the redundancy of the scheme. It is easy to verify that for all practically relevant values, the first term in ε sim in (3) is the dominating one. With the same argument as in the case of two rounds, by Theorems 3.1/3.2 and Theorem 2.3 the overhead for n-bit security can (up to a small additive constant) be computed as
In order to bound E[Q(µ, q h )] we assume n ≤ log ρ ≤ 1.25n and hence log µ = log N − 2 log ρ ≥ log N − 2(1.25n). The following table summarizes the overhead O(n, q s , q h ) for n = 80 bits security using (4) and the bounds on Pr[Q(µ, q h ) ≥ q h 2 s ] from Theorem 6.2 in Section 6. We use log N ∈ {1024, 2048} as bit-length of RSA and log q h ∈ {60, 80} as upper bound on the random oracle queries.
log N log q h t = log µ s 
Indifferentiability Proof for Four Round Feistel
The proof of Theorem 4.2 is organized as follows. In Section 5.1 we formally define Q(q, µ). In Section 5.2 we prove a technical lemma (Lemma 5.2) which informally bounds the advantage of anyuery adversary in making a fresh query x to H 1 (variables as in Figure 2 , right) such that for some v, in the evaluation of φ 4F (x, v, 0) the input z to H 3 has already been queried. Next, in Lemma 5.3 we prove the pub-indifferentiability of C H 4F (·) = φ 4F (·, ·, 0) as claimed in Theorem 4.2. Finally, in Section 6 we prove a q 1+o(1) upper bound on Q(µ, q).
Density of Subgraphs of Random Cayley Graphs
For µ, q ∈ N let B be a subset of Z µ of size q, we define the value Q(µ, q, B) = max
We will be interested in the random variable Q(µ, q, B) where B is a randomly chosen q element subset of Z µ , we denote this variable by Q(µ, q).
It will be convenient to think of Q(µ, q) in terms of random Cayley graphs as we will explain now. For B ⊂ Z µ , |B| = q we denote with C(µ, q, B) the bipartite graph with µ vertices on each side which we identify with the elements of Z µ . The edge set is e (C(µ, q, B) 
With this notion Q(µ, q, B) is the maximum number of edges in any subgraph of C(µ, q, B) with q vertices on each side. Trivial lower and upper bounds on Q(µ, q, B) are
In the proposition below we observe that known results on the edge density of graphs without 4-cycles already give us an q 1.5 upper bound on the expected value E[Q(µ, q)]. In Section 6 we will prove an upper bound of q 1+o(1) , thus almost matching the lower bound.
Proof. We first observe that C(µ, q, B) ← C(µ, q) has a 4-cycle with probability at most
The proposition now follows from a result by Naor and Verstraëte [19] who show that a bipartite graph with q vertices on each side that does not contain a 4-cycle has at most q 1.5 + 2q edges. With probability at most q 4 /µ ≤ 1/q we have a cycle, in which case we use the trivial q 2 upper bound which adds another q = q 2 /q to the expected value.
A Game on Three Round Feistel
In this section we describe a game, where an attacker A can query three randomly chosen functions
, which we think of as round functions of a Feistel network φ 3f as illustrated in Figure 2 (left). Informally, the adversary wins if she makes a fresh query x to H 1 , such that the input z to H 3 in the evaluation of φ 3f (x, 0) has already been queried. We will call this game the z-collision game and prove (in Lemma 5.2 below) an E[Q(µ, q)]/ρ upper bound for any q-query adversary for the z-collision game.
Next, we will show that the same bound on the winning advantage holds for a similar game on the Feistel-network φ 3F as illustrated in Figure 2 (right) , where we have an extra Z ρ domain on the right side. Here we say the adversary wins if she makes a query x ∈ Z µ such that there exists a v ∈ Z ρ such that in the evaluation of φ 3F (x, v, 0) the input z is not fresh. We will later use the bound on the winning advantage for the z-collision game on φ 3F as key technical lemma to prove the pub-indifferentiability of C H 4F . As in the pub-indifferentiability proof the random functions are defined via lazy sampling (done by the simulator), we will already use lazy sampling in the proof of our upper bound for the z-collision game. More precisely, we will consider functionsĤ 1 ,Ĥ 2 ,Ĥ 3 which initially are undefined on all inputs. The sets X , Z ⊂ Z µ , Y ⊂ Z ρ denote the inputs toĤ 1 ,Ĥ 3 andĤ 2 on which the outputs have been defined, initially X , Y, Z = ∅. Moreover we initialize a variable FAIL := 0, the adversary wins the game if at the end of the game FAIL > 0. We will assume thatĤ 2 is a random injective function as this will make the proofs a bit cleaner. One cannot distinguish a random from a random injective function with range Z µ makingueries with advantage better than q 2 /µ. As we will later set µ ≥ ρ 3 , this term will be dominated by other terms Ω(q/ρ) and thus we will simply ignore it.
The z-collision game on φ 3f . Consider an adversary A who can make queries to the three functions (at most most q to each) which are answered as follows: 
OutputĤ 1 (x).
We will now upper bound the success probability of any adversary making at mostueries to each of the three function to win the z-collision game (i.e. achieve FAIL > 0).
Trivial lower and upper bounds on the winning advantage of the z-collision game are q/ρ and q 2 /ρ. We will now give an upper bound on the advantage in terms of Q(µ, q) introduced in Section 5.1.
Lemma 5.2
The advantage of any q-query adversary A in winning the z-collision game on φ 3f (i.e. force FAIL > 0) is at most
Proof. We will only sketch the proof, as this lemma is used to get an intuition for Lemma 5.3 below.
Consider the queries X , Y, Z made by A, and recall that B =Ĥ 2 (Y). Consider the subgraph with bipartition (X , Y) of the bipartite Cayley graph C(µ, q, B). Now for any x ∈ X , let B x = {b ∈ B : x + b ∈ Z} be the number of edges from x to Z. The x query will increase FAIL iff the a ← Z ρ we sampled is a preimage of some b ∈ B x (i.e.Ĥ 2 (a) = b ∈ B x ), this probability is |B x |/ρ. Summing over all x ∈ X we get E[FAIL] = x∈X |B x |/ρ ≤ Q(µ, q, B)/ρ. This is the expectation after B has been fixed, as B is a random subset
Finally, note that E[FAIL] ≥ Pr[FAIL = 1] as FAIL is an integer ≥ 0. Let us mention that eq. (6) is tight and equality is achieved by the following attack strategy. First make anyueries toĤ 2 which gives us a random set B (asĤ 2 is injective, |B| = |Y| = q). Next, identify the sets X , Z of size q s.t. the (X , Z) subgraph of C(µ, q, B) has the most edges, by definition this number is Q(µ, q, B). Make all Z queries toĤ 3 , followed by all X queries toĤ 1 .
Ultimately, our goal is to prove pub-indifferentiability from F. The above lemma is a good start as it tells us that for the evaluation function C H 3f (x) = φ 3f (x, 0) with probability 1 − E[Q(µ, q)]/ρ the following holds: whenever a q-query adversary makes an x query toĤ 1 , the resulting z input toĤ 3 will be "fresh", and thus we will be able to program the output c :=Ĥ 3 (z) such that it is consistent with F(x). By adding one more round to the Feistel network we will be able to program also the left Z µ part of the input. Unfortunately, this will only work as long as the inputs to this fourth function are fresh. As its inputs are over Z ρ , there is a Θ(q 2 /ρ) chance we have a collision on these inputs and will not be able to program after all. Summing up, we are no better than the q 2 /ρ bound we already got for the two round Feistel in Theorem 4.1. To overcome this problem, we will simply increase the domain on the right side of the Feistel to Z ρ × Z ρ , but in order to not increase the redundancy space, this extra Z ρ space is used for the message, not redundancy. We will now show that the z-collision game on this new C H 3F (x, v) = φ 3F (x, v, 0) padding scheme is still hard.
The z-collision game on φ 3F . 2. For all (y 0 , y 1 ) ∈ Y where a 1 = y 1 and x +Ĥ 2 (y 0 , y 1 ) ∈ Z set FAIL := FAIL + 1.
Lemma 5.3
The advantage of any q-query adversary A in winning the z-collision game on φ 3F (i.e. force FAIL > 0) is at most
Proof. Consider the queries X , Y, Z made by A, and recall that B =Ĥ 2 (Y). For any query x ∈ X , let B x = {b ∈ B : x + b ∈ Z}. Note that |B x | is the number of edges from x to Z in the Cayley graph C (µ, q, B) . The expected value by which this x query will increase FAIL is
To see this, note that for any b ∈ B, the probability that FAIL will increase because of this b is 0 if x + b ∈ Z (equivalently b ∈ B x ), and 1/ρ otherwise. More precisely, FAIL will increase if the (a 0 , a 1 ) we sample and the preimage (y 0 , y 1 ) of b (i.e.Ĥ 2 (y 0 , y 1 ) = b) satisfy a 1 = y 1 , and as a 1 is uniform, Pr[a 1 = y 1 ] = 1/ρ. By definition x∈X |B x | is the number of edges of the (X , Z) subgraph of C(µ, q, B), we have for a fixed B
E[FAIL] ≤ Q(µ, q, B)/ρ
and as B is sampled uniformly at random
Proof of Theorem 4.2
Let q D = q F + q H , where q F and q H denotes the number of queries D makes to its first and second oracle, respectively. As in the proof of Theorem 4.1 for the two-round Feistel our simulator S F (given access to a random function F : Z µ × Z ρ → Z µ × Z ρ × Z ρ ) will define fake random oracleŝ H i , i = 1, . . . , 4 by lazy sampling.Ĥ 1 (x) = ♦ denotesĤ 1 is undefined on input x. The sets X , Y, Z, W define the inputs on whichĤ 1 , . . . ,Ĥ 4 have already been defined. The sets A, B, C, D are the corresponding outputs, e.g. A =Ĥ 1 (X ). The simulator also initializes variables FAIL i := 0 for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} which will only be used in the proof. Informally, whenever the simulator cannot define theĤ i 's consistently, it sets FAIL j := 1 (for which j depends on the reason why it fails) and aborts, by this we mean it just stops giving any more outputs.
Below we define how S F answers the q H queries toĤ i , i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and updates its state on the q F queries to F, but let us first give some intuition.
One important property of S F is the fact that whenever it assign a valueĤ i (α) := β, then β is uniformly random and independent of the variables we've seen so far (in some cases S F samples β at random itself, sometimes the randomness comes from F.) This property is required so we can later argue that distinguishing oracles F, S F from C H 4F , H is upper bounded by the probability that S F fails.
Another important invariant is that whenever CĤ 4F (x, v) is defined (i.e. theĤ i are defined on all inputs required to evaluate φ 4F (x, v, 0) with round functionsĤ i ) and the simulator did not yet fail, then the output is consistent with F, i.e. F(x, v) = CĤ 4F (x, v). That this invariant holds can be seen as follows. Assume the evaluation of CĤ 4F (x, v) is defined and consider the inputs x, y, z to the first three round functions. By definition of the simulator, if the last of these inputs to be defined was x (i.e. we assigned a value toĤ 1 (x) at a point whereĤ 2 (y),Ĥ 3 (z) were already defined) or y, then the simulator failed (we will have set FAIL 0 = 1 if the query was y or FAIL 1 = 1 if it was x). If the last value to be defined wasĤ 3 (z), then by definition of the simulator alsoĤ 4 will be programmed such that the entire evaluation of CĤ 4F (x, v) is defined and outputs F(x, v). The variable FAIL 2 will be set to 1 if we failed to programĤ 4 because it was already defined on the required input. The variable FAIL 3 will be set to 1 if there exist two different query pairs (x, y), (x , y ) that are consistent with z, as here we won't be able to programĤ 3 (z) to be consistent with both.
If D makes a F(x, v) query, our simulator makes sure that CĤ 4F (x, v) is defined and equals F(x, v) by doing the same it would do if the adversary queriesĤ 1 ,Ĥ 2 ,Ĥ 3 (in this order) on the inputs required to evaluate CĤ 4F (x, v) .
We now define how S F answers the ≤ q H queries toĤ i , i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and updates its state on the ≤ q F queries to F, F −1 as follows:
•Ĥ 2 query y ∈ Z ρ × Z ρ : If y ∈ Y sample b ← Z µ and setĤ 2 (y) := b. OutputĤ 2 (y). If x + b = z for some x ∈ X , z ∈ Z set FAIL 0 := 1 and abort.
•Ĥ 4 query w ∈ Z ρ × Z ρ : If w ∈ W sample d ← Z µ and setĤ 4 (w) := d. OutputĤ 4 (w).
•Ĥ 3 query z ∈ Z µ : If z ∈ Z and there exist two distinct pairs of messages x, (y 0 , y 1 ) and
1. a 1 = y 1 and a 1 = y 1 2. z =Ĥ 2 (y 0 , y 1 ) + x =Ĥ 2 (y 0 , y 1 ) + x then set FAIL 3 := 1 and abort. (Here we fail as z appears in two queries (x, y 0 − a 0 , 0) and (x , y 0 − a 0 , 0) to CĤ 4F , and we won't be able to programĤ 3 (z) to be consistent with both). Otherwise, if z ∈ Z and there exists exactly one pair x, (y 0 , y 1 ) ∈ X × Y s.t. a 1 = y 1 and z =Ĥ 2 (y 0 , y 1 ) + x, try to programĤ 3 ,Ĥ 4 s.t. CĤ 4F (x, y 0 − a 0 , 0) = F(x, y 0 − a 0 ) as follows: f 2 ) ∈ W set FAIL 2 := 1 and abort (fail due to collision on w value) 4.Ĥ 4 (f 1 , f 2 ) := f 0 − z (programĤ 4 (w)) Otherwise, if z ∈ Z and no such pair exists, sample c ← Z ρ × Z ρ and setĤ 3 (z) := c.
Then for all (y 0 , y 1 ) ∈ Y where a 1 = y 1 try to programĤ 3 ,Ĥ 4 s.t. CĤ 4F (x, y 0 − a 0 , 0) = F(x, y 0 − a 0 ) as follows:
IfĤ 2 (y 0 , y 1 ) + x ∈ Z set FAIL 1 := 1 and abort (fail due to collision on z value) 3. Now make a z query toĤ 3 (z) as described above. 6 • F query (x, v) ∈ Z µ ×Z ρ : Here the simulator doesn't have to output anything, but it updates its state trying to program theĤ i s.t. CĤ 4F (x, v, 0) = F(x, v) as follows: query (a 0 , a 1 ) ← H 1 (x) (as described above), then query b ←Ĥ 2 (v + a 0 , a 1 ) and finally (c 0 , c 1 ) ←Ĥ 3 (x + b) (note that we don't have to queryĤ 4 explicitly as theĤ 3 query already programsĤ 4 .)
e., the adversary inverted F on "fresh" value) set FAIL 4 := 1.
We will bound the probability that FAIL i = 1 for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, and then can use standard arguments to show that the advantage of distinguishing F, S F from C H , H is upper bounded by the sum of these probabilities. We first consider FAIL 4 , which is the probability that D by manages to make a query u ∈ Z µ × Z ρ × Z ρ which hits one of the Z µ × Z ρ elements in the (uniformly random) range of F. The probability of u falling in this set is at most 1/ρ, taking the union bound we get
We will now bound the sizes of X , Y, Z, W which will give the same upper bounds on A, B, C and D, respectively. As X and Y can only increase by at most 1 on aĤ 1 ,Ĥ 2 or F query, we have
Bounding |Z| and |W| is less trivial, as anĤ 1 query can increase |Z| and |W| by as much as |Y|, and thus we only get a q 2 D upper bound. Fortunately the expected increase of |Z|, |W| on a query x toĤ 1 is only |Y|/ρ ≤ q D /ρ ≤ 1 as (y 0 , y 1 ) ∈ Y will increase |Z|, |W| if y 1 = a 1 for the randomly chosen a 1 ∈ Z ρ . Moreover aĤ 3 orĤ 4 query can increase |Z| and |W| by at most 1. We get a bound on the expected size of Z, W of
Below, we will also need an upper bound on E[|W| 2 ]. As mentioned, the expected increase of |W| with every x query is |Y|/ρ, the case which maximizes E[|W| 2 ] is when this increase is either |Y| (with probability ρ −1 ) or 0, as this maximizes the variance of |W|, and thus also the expectation E[|W| 2 ]. The probability that we increase by |Y| more than t times is at most
The same bound holds for |Z|, and from now on we'll assume
We can safely ignore the tiny 1/ρ probability that this fails to hold. We will now bound the probability that FAIL 0 := 1 will be set in any of the queries toĤ 2 . There are at most |X ||Z| possible b ∈ Z µ s.t. x + b = z for some x ∈ X , z ∈ Z, thus a random b will fall in this set with probability at most |X ||Z|/µ. Taking the union bound over all ≤ q D queries tô
Next, we will bound the probability that FAIL 2 := 1 will be set while processing a z query tô H 3 . We set FAIL 2 := 1 if the uniformly random (f 1 , f 2 ) falls into the set W, which happens with probability |W|/(ρ 2 ). Taking the union bound over the at most |W| times we increase W and (9) in the second step
To bound the probability that FAIL 1 := 1 will be set, we observe that from an adversary D who manages to set FAIL := 1 when interacting with F, S F , we can get an adversary A which wins the z-collision game on φ 3F with at least the same probability. Using this observation with the bound from Lemma 5.3 and the upper bound on |Z| as given (9) would give Pr[
We can get a better bound using E[|Z|] ≤ 2q D and the fact that for any c ≥ 1, Q(µ, q) increases by at most a factor c if we allow the Z in (5) to have size cq instead of q (this follows from the maximality of Z.) In particular this gives
We will now bound Pr[FAIL 3 = 1]. To have FAIL 3 = 1 it must be the case that at some point the adversary makes a fresh query y ∈ Y s.t. the random outputĤ 3 (y) = b satisfies x + b = x + b = z for some (x, x , b ) ∈ X × X × B and z ∈ Z (it's not possible the x query was made after the y query as by our handling ofĤ 1 queries in this case we'd have z ∈ Z). As there are at most |X | 2 |Y| ≤ q 3 D triples, (x , b , x), each giving rise to one possible "target" b = x + b − x, the probability to hit any of them in the at most q D queries is at most
Finally, we can bound
using standard arguments like in the proof of Theorem 4.1.
A Bit of Additive Combinatorics
Additive combinatorics deals with questions of the sort that given an Abelian group A, find subsets Z, X of given size that minimizes the size of Z − X = {z − x|z ∈ Z, x ∈ X } Often we also want to find out the structure of such optimal (or nearly optimal) Z, X pairs. Such pairs are of course special, and we do not have too many of them. Analogous questions are also raised when the '−' is replaced with '+'.
Here we investigate a variant, where we also have a third set B ⊆ A with the same size as Z and X with the property that z − x ∈ B for an unusually large number (say, |B| 3/2 ) of (x, z) pairs with z ∈ Z and x ∈ X . We show that for an adequately small random B it is very unlikely that we can find any Z, X such that Z, X and B form a triplet as above. We may interpret our result as a property of the random Cayley graph generated by B.
Remark 6.1 Although our setting is natural and undoubtedly useful for the application at hand, the problem we raise does not seem to have been studied before. An often-cited work of B. J. Green [13] computes the maximum clique size of (dense) random Cayley graphs of cyclic groups and of Z n 2 . Other authors e.g. Christofides and N. Alon have also investigated random Cayley graphs, but with focus on Hamiltonicity, chromatic number, etc. The size of the generator set, unlike in our case, in most studies are either very small (poly(log |A|)) or very large (Ω(|A|)). Since spectra of random Cayley graphs have been studied, it is conceivable that there is a shorter analytic proof to our statement. We use simple combinatorics to prove our theorem.
We (non-crucially) set the Abelian group A to be the cyclic group Z µ , where µ is a prime. Let 1 ≤ q ≤ µ arbitrary, but we will think of it as a small constant power of µ, for instance q = µ 0.1 . For a set B ⊂ Z µ , |B| = q define Q(µ, q, B) = max
Expression (14) becomes a random variable Q(µ, q, .) as B ranges over all uniformly random B ⊆ Z µ of size q. This random variable was also defined in Section 5.1. The minimum value of this random variable is at least q, because for any B one can choose Z = B and 0 ∈ X . We show that if q is a small power of µ, the probability of the event that this random variable much exceeds q is small. To obtain practical expressions in the theorem and simpler formulas in the proof, we introduce µ = 2 t and q = 2 r . Theorem 6.2 For 0 < r < t/4, and for every s, l > 0, 2 s ≥ l 2 it holds that
where D = 2 s− r l /(2l + 2) and B = t − l(r + 1).
Corollary 6.3 Let q = µ a , where a ≤ 1/4. If q is large enough (while parameter a is fixed), then
We defer the proof of the corollary to after that of the theorem.
Proof. (of Theorem 6.2) Let µ = 2 t denote the size of the group, which we assume to be Z µ , but this is not essential. We prove Theorem 6.2 by an information compression argument. What we show is that a set B satisfying |B| = 2 r , Q(2 t , 2 r , B) ≥ 2 r+s has a lot of constant size linear relations between its elements, which allows us to describe it with significantly less than log 2 t 2 r bits. In order to encode a B ⊆ Z µ for which |B| = 2 r , Q(2 t , 2 r , B) ≥ 2 r+s efficiently, we show that any such B has a decomposition B = D ∪ D, where |D| = D as in the theorem, D = B \ D, and there exist fixed x, z ∈ Z µ that the elements b of D can be ordered suitably and be expressed as 2 r − log
Since the sequence 1 , b 1 , . . . , l−1 , b l−1 together with can be described with (l − 1)(r + 1) + 1 bits (each b i is element of B which is already on our list, so has an r-bit description), our saving per item is
bits. Our total saving is then DB − t, since we also need t bits to describe z − x (once for the entire D). The upper bound on the probability of the event Q(2 t , 2 r , B) ≥ 2 r+s is then 2 −DB+t .
We are left to construct the (D, D) decomposition and to calculate D. Consider a B that satisfies Q(2 t , 2 r , B) ≥ 2 r+s . Then there are X , Z ⊆ Z µ , |X | = |Z| = 2 r such that |{(x, z) | x ∈ X , z ∈ Z, z − x ∈ B}| ≥ 2 r+s . We fix such an X , Z pair. Let G be the bipartite graph with bipartition (X , Z) and edge set
By our assumption |e(G)| ≥ 2 r+s . If we iteratively remove the minimum degree vertex from G until all degrees of the resulting graph are at least 2 s /2 (i.e. the average degree of G divided by two), it is easy to show that this process ends up with a non-empty graph G with minimum degree at least 2 s /2. Fix a vertex x ∈ X ∩ V (G ) . Our proof hinges upon the following construction: Definition 6.4 Let P i for i = 1, 2, . . . be the set of all those (not necessarily simple) paths π of length i in G (the length is the number of edges) that satisfy:
1. π starts at x 2. No two edges edges of π have identical labels, where a label of an edge
is by definition w − v.
Let π be a path in P i and let d = d(π) denote the degree of its end point z. All edges incident to z have distinct labels, so the number of those edges incident to z whose label do not coincide with any labels we already have in π is at least d − i. Thus π has d − i ≥ 2 s 2 − i continuations in P i+1 . Therefore, by induction, for i ≥ 1:
Consider the set P l . Notice that if l is odd, then every path in P l end in Z, otherwise they all end in X . Since the nodes of G are from X ∪ Z and |X |, |Z| = 2 r , there must be a z ∈ X (if l is even) or z ∈ Z (if l is odd) such that at least
2 ls−r 2 l paths from P l end in z. Let T be the set of the paths in P l that end in this z. We will use the paths in T to find a lot of small linear relations among the elements of B. For a path π let (π) denote the set of labels that occur on its edges, and define D 0 = ∪ π∈T (π), which is just the collection of all labels that ever occur in those paths of P l that end in z. Of course, D 0 ⊆ B, because all labels along the edges of G are in B. In order to estimate |D 0 | we view a path π ∈ P l as an ordered sequence of labels. Each π ∈ P l uniquely corresponds to such a sequence of length l (although not necessarily every element of D l 0 is an element of P l ). Since from an alphabet of size |D 0 | we can create at most |D 0 | l different sequences of length l, we have that
We are now ready to define the decomposition B = D ∪ D as promised in the beginning. The role of x and z in expression (15) will be played by the common starting-and end-point of all paths in T . For any path π ∈ T we have that
It is a trivial matter to transform the above equation into (15) , where b is one of the b i s (our choice which one). What remains is to show is that starting from a subset of T we can to generate all remaining elements by (15) such, that the number of generated elements is no less than the bound we require. A combinatorial lemma will help us in this.
Definition 6.5 We say that a set {h 1 , . . . , h l−1 } of nodes in an undirected hyper-graph H generates node h, if {h 1 , . . . , h l−1 , h} is a hyper-edge. A generator set for H is a subset of nodes from which we can iteratively generate the entire vertex set of H. Lemma 6.6 Let H be an hyper-graph on m nodes such that every edge is a set of size at most l, and every node is contained in at least one hyper-edge. Then H has a generator of size at most
Proof. The proof is by induction on l. The claim is trivial for l = 1. Take a minimal generator set X for H. If it does not satisfy our condition, then |X| >
. Consider the hyper-graph H we get from H by restricting all of its nodes and edges to X. Since a minimal generator set in H cannot properly contain any hyper-edge, every hyper-edge in H has size at most l − 1. Thus by induction H has a generator set Y of size at least 
if q is large enough (above exp 2 (z) is by definition 2 z ). Thus 2 −DB+t ≤ 2 −q a /2 when q is sufficiently large.
A Indifferentiability of the two round Feistel network A.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof. Let q D = q F + q H , where q F and q H denote the number of queries D makes to its first and second oracle, respectively. We have to specify a simulator S such that for any q D -query distinguisher D and a random invertible function F :
where the probability is over the choice of F, H and the randomness used by S and D. The simulator S F will internally define fake random oraclesĤ 1 ,Ĥ 2 by lazy sampling which initially are undefined on all inputs.Ĥ 1 (x) = ♦ denotesĤ 1 is undefined on input x. The set X ⊂ Z µ will denote the inputs on whichĤ 1 has already been defined, and A =Ĥ 1 (X ) are the corresponding outputs. Similarly Y, B =Ĥ 2 (Y) denote the inputs and the corresponding outputs on whichĤ 2 has been defined. The simulator also initializes a variable FAIL := 0 which will only be used in the proof below. Informally, if at the end of the experiment FAIL = 1 then this indicates that S F failed to define theĤ 1 ,Ĥ 2 such that CĤ 2f (·) looks consistent with F(·) given all queries made so far. If this happens, the simulator aborts which means it refuses to answer any more queries. We now define how S F answers queries toĤ 1 andĤ 2 and how it updates its state if D F ,S F makes an F or F −1 query. If this is anĤ 1 (and not a F) query outputĤ 1 (x).
F −1 query u ∈ Z µ × Z ρ : query x ← F −1 (u), if x = ⊥ andĤ 1 (x) = ♦ set FAIL := 1 and abort.
Considering the efficiency of our simulator, note that S F does exactly one oracle query for every F, F −1 and H 1 query of D F ,H (and no query for an H 2 ar query), so q S ≤ q H + q F = q D .
To prove eq. (16) we will first bound the probability that FAIL = 1 in the above experiment. Note that |Y| (i.e., the number of inputs on whichĤ 2 is defined) increases by at most 1 on everŷ H 1 ,Ĥ 2 and F query, thus |Y| ≤ q H + q F .
Further, FAIL can only be set to 1 on aĤ 1 or F query, and this happens if the uniformly random f 1 is in Y. For every query, this happens with probability ≤ |Y|/ρ. Taking the union bound over allĤ 1 , F queries we get Pr[FAIL = 1] ≤ (q H + q F ) 2 /ρ. 
To see this, note that S assigns uniformly random values to theĤ i (the randomness is either sampled directly or comes from the random function F) which are independent of anything that happend so far. (18) implies (17) by standard arguments like the fundamental lemma of game-playing.
A.2 The overhead of the two round Feistel construction
By combining Theorem 4.1 with Theorems 3.1/3.2 and Theorem 2.3 we obtain the following corrollary.
Corollary A.1 (Security and minimal overhead for SIG-MR Let τ * be the forgery and let b * ||M * be the bit and the recovered message. Note that the value b(M * ) is information-theoretically hidden from the adversary's view and with probability 1/2 we have b(M * ) = b * . In the latter case the adversary has managed to find a pre-image under f ek on an uniformly distributed value coming from the outside of the experiment. More formally we claim that Pr[G 3 = 1] ≤ 1 2 · ε one−way .
We sketch a proof of the claim. For the simulation, we need TDP to be homomorphic to be able to embed one single challenge from the one-wayness experiment into all extended signatures τ which contain b||M such that b = b(M ). Concretely, the adversary A against one-wayness inputs ek and y = f ek (x). It simulates the oracles 
